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Since its inception in 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("the Tribunal") has yet to convict an accused charged with
committing war crimes in the 1994 internal armed conflict. The Tribunal
in the Prosecutor v. Akayesu,' Kayishema & Ruzindana,2 Rutaganda3
and Musema 4 considered indictments that charged accused persons with
the commission of war crimes. The Trial Chambers of the Tribunal dealt
with, inter alia, interpretation of Article 4 of the Statute of the
international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("the Statute"), and proof of
a link, or nexus, between war crimes and the internal armed conflict that
took place in Rwanda between January 1 and July 17 of 1994.5 In the
above cases, the Trial Chambers held that the culpable acts of the
accused were not linked to the internal armed conflict and, therefore, not
a violation of Article 4 of the Statute. In other words, the culpable acts
did not constitute war crimes.
This paper is not concerned with the correctness of the decisions
of the Trial Chambers, or with the wisdom of the Trial Chamber's
various attempts to check the limits and scope of application of Article 4
of the Statute. Rather, this paper is concerned with the philosophical
approach that the Trial Chambers appear to have adopted in reaching its
decision that no war crimes were committed because the Prosecutor did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a nexus between war crimes and
armed conflict. It is argued that no coherent philosophy emerges to
*(LLB) (Hons) Makerere University, (LLM), (LLD) (Stockholm) Diploma in Legal Practice (LDC),
Advocate, Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, The International Criminal Tribunal For
Rwanda. The views expressed in this article are personal and in no ways reflect those of the United
Nations, the International Criminal Tribunal, or the Office of the Prosecutor. The invaluable
comments of Beverly Gardner, Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Case No.ICTR-96-4-T, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, (Sept. 2, 1998).
2 Case No.ICTR-95-I-T,The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, (May 21,
1999).
3 Case No.ICTR-96-3-T, The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, (December
6, 1999).
4 Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, (Jan. 27, 2000).
5 See Case No. ICTR-97-20, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, at Annex A, paragraph 3; In
determining that the internal armed conflict in Rwanda commenced on I January and ended on 17
July 1994. (Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice and Presumptions of Facts
Pursuant to Rules 94 and 54).
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which the Trial Chambers consistently appeal in reaching the decisions
that the Prosecutor did not establish a nexus between war crimes and
internal armed conflict as stipulated in Article 4 of the Statute. It is
further argued that the Trial Chamber's reluctance to provide a positive
definition of the concept of "nexus" that it has or acts upon in reaching
decisions, as against a negative definition used in determining that a
nexus has not been established, tends to undermine a constructive legal
effort to examine the concept of nexus the Trial Chambers have or act on
when determining the existence, or lack thereof, of a nexus between war
crimes and armed conflict.
Based on the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, it is argued that the
Trial Chambers and the Prosecutor appear to have different perceptions
of the term "nexus," particularly when interpreting Article 4 of the
Statute. These differences appear to be based on their choice as to
whether to adopt the principle of judicial activism, also known as liberal
interpretation of statutes, on the one hand or the principle of judicial
restraint, known as strict interpretation of statutes, on the other, when
considering whether a nexus exists between war crimes and internal
armed conflict.
The principle of judicial activism holds that courts should work
out principles of legality, revise these principles from time to time in the
light of what seems to the court fresh moral insights, and then interpret
the statutes accordingly. 6 Therefore, the principle of judicial activism is
intended to take into account changing circumstances not foreseen at the
time the Statute was adopted. The principle of judicial activism
presupposes a certain objectivity of moral principle; in particular it
presupposes that citizens do have certain moral rights against the state.
Only if such moral rights exist in some sense, can activism be justified as
a program based on something beyond the judge's personal preferences.
On the other hand, the principle of judicial restraint attacks
activism at its roots; it argues that in fact individuals have no such moral
rights against the state. They have only such legal rights as the law grants
them, and these are limited to the plain and uncontroversial violations
that the framers must have actually had in mind, or that have been
established in a line of precedents.7
Therefore, the principle of judicial restraint holds that courts
should not consider changing circumstances because those who drafted
the Statute did not consider it. Consideration of what the drafters might
have done if they had current facts is mere speculation. Consequently,
6 This is the most common denominator of the principle of "judicial activism." Its proponent
generally qualify it in ways that are not considered in this analysis since it does not affect the
premises of my submission.
7 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 137-140 (Harvard University Press,
1977).
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the principle of judicial restraint advances the view that courts should
interpret statutes strictly and if decisions of courts conflict with fresh
moral insights, then it is the responsibility of the legislature to amend the
law in a manner such that it reflects the new situation that the old statute
did not cater to. It is not the duty of the courts to generously interpret the
law so that it takes care of a new situation that the courts are not legally
mandated under existing law to attend to. Such an action would amount
to courts taking over the functions of the legislature.
However, a distinction between judicial activism and judicial
restraint may be confusing because the two principles, while addressing
the same issue, adopt different approaches. Therefore, these two different
approaches should be separated. The first approach is to consider
whether the court should adhere to the strict text of the statute, and not
consider the intention of those who drafted the statute, hence not evaluate
or admit into evidence new circumstances that did not exist at the time
the statute was drafted. This approach would be characterized as judicial
restraint or strict interpretation of statutes. On the other hand, when
applying the principle of judicial activism, the same or similar issue
would be framed thus: "should the courts consider, or admit into
evidence, new facts, moral insights or circumstances that may affect or
alter the outcome of a case. The first approach is a negative and narrow
interpretation of a statute while the second approach is positive and
expansive.
Determining the perception held by the Security Council on what
it meant by the term nexus when it adopted Article 4 of the Statute
requires an examination of the proceedings of the Security Council,8
while that of the Trial Chambers rests on examining its decisions.
In considering what the Security Council might have meant by
the term "nexus," when it adopted Article 4, let us suppose that when the
Security Council adopted the Article, what the term nexus "meant" was
limited to the instances that they had in mind as constituting a nexus, or,
at least, to those instances that the Security Council would have thought
were a nexus between war crimes and internal armed conflict if they had
them in mind. Further, suppose that at the time of the adoption of Article
4 of the Statute the Security Council did not know of the existence, or if
they knew, they did not know the extent of the role played by, the
Interahamwe 9 in the Rwanda armed conflict.
8 S.C. Res. 955, U. N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg., Annex, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
9 The Interahamwe were members of the youth wing of the MRND, the majority political party in
the Interim Government between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The members and leaders of the
Interahamwe were given military training by the Rwanda Armed Forces ("the FAR"), and supplied
with guns, grenades, machetes, etc. The Interahamwe supported the FAR in its war efforts against
the Rwanda Patriotic Front ("RPF"), specialising in killing Tutsi civilians deemed accomplices,
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Arising from the above, it would be reasonable for the Tribunal
to determine what the Security Council meant by the term nexus at the
time Article 4 was adopted. After a determination is made, it would not
do for the judges of the Trial Chambers to substitute their own ideas of
what may or may not constitute a nexus between war crimes and internal
armed conflict for those of the Security Council.
This approach, to some extent, would operate to limit the Trial
Chamber's ability to consider, and admit in evidence, culpable acts of the
Interahamwe. Consequently, the interpretation yields a narrow view
because it prevents the Trial Chamber from examining the intention of
the drafters of the Statute and the factual situation on the ground, and
other circumstantial evidence that led to the violation of Article 4 during
the internal armed conflict and the information that was discovered after
the adoption of the statute that could provide a better understanding of
the circumstances under which the Interahamwe committed the culpable
acts.
This strict method of interpretation of statutes forces those who
favor a more liberal approach to concede that they are departing from
strict legal authority; a departure they must then seek to justify by
appealing only to the desirability of the results reached.1° For example,
they would appeal to moral sentiments and argue that to ignore newly
discovered relevant facts would allow the guilty to go free and
unpunished.
While the distinction between "strict" or "liberal" interpretation
of statutes, or application of the principle of "judicial activism" or
"judicial restraint" is important, it is equally important to make a
distinction between concept and conception, particularly when viewed in
the context of establishing a nexus between war crimes and internal
armed conflict.
In making a distinction between concept and conception, let us
suppose that a group of persons form an organization, for example a
Chess Club. In this club, one of its rules provides that members of the
Chess Club hold in common a belief that certain acts, if committed while
playing a game of chess, may result in a moral defect which shall be
deemed unfair. An act deemed unfair results in a wrongful division of
benefits and burdens, or a wrongful attribution of praise or blame to the
member committing such an act. Further, according to the rules and
practices of the Club, the members agree on a great number of standard
cases of unfairness and use these as benchmarks against which to test
other, more controversial alleged acts of unfairness.
agents or spies of the RPF. Many of the persons killed by the Interahamwe were civilian men,
women and children.
10 See Dworkin, supra note 7 at p.134-135 (stating, "this theory, however, ignores a distinction that
philosophers have made but lawyers have not yet appreciated").
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According to the above example, the Chess Club has a concept
of unfairness. Members of the Club may appeal to that concept in moral
argument in proving whether or not a particular act committed by one or
more members against another member constitutes unfairness, or
unequal division of benefits and burden. But each member of the Chess
Club may nevertheless differ over a large number of these controversial
acts, in a way that suggests that each member of the Chess Club either
has or acts on a different theory of why some acts constitute acts of
unfairness and others do not. The result is that some members may differ
on which fundamental principles, standards if you will, must be relied
upon to show that a particular act is unfair.
For all members to agree that an act constitutes unfairness, it is
important that the Chess Club formulate a concept of fairness that is
uniformly understood by all. Similarly, it is necessary that the Trial
Chamber formulate the concept of nexus it has or acts upon when
deciding cases. A positive formulation of the concept of nexus would
make it objectively possible to provide a philosophical explanation of
why testimony presented by the Prosecutor and admitted into evidence
by the Trial Chamber does not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
nexus between war crimes and internal armed conflict.
The application of different concepts and conceptions of a nexus
between war crimes and armed conflict by the two organs of the Tribunal
may result in the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor talking at each other,
rather than to one another. It is therefore pertinent that the two organs of
the Tribunal agree on which concept of nexus it has or acts upon
subsequently, if the Prosecutor has or acts on a different concept, she will
then be in a position to know which concept the Trial Chamber has or
acts upon, and therefore be in a better position to adduce evidence that
may prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, a nexus between war crimes and
internal armed conflict.
While it is reasonable for the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor
to differ on the conception of a nexus, both organs of the Tribunal should
be able to agree on the concept itself. If the Trial Chamber and the
Prosecutor do not agree on the concept of nexus, for example, the
threshold or benchmark against which to test whether the evidence
adduced by the Prosecutor objectively establishes a nexus, then the two
organs of the Tribunal may be doing two different things simultaneously,
and therefore are more likely not to agree on the final decision.
To illustrate the point, let us re-visit the Security Council
deliberation and consider what it might have meant by the term nexus
when it adopted Article 4 of the Statute. Let us suppose that the Security
Council left to the Trial Chambers the responsibility to determine for
themselves what constitutes a nexus. If this were the authority the
Council extended to the Tribunal, the Trial Chambers would have the
responsibility to develop and apply their own conception of nexus.
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Further, the Trial Chambers would have the mandate to change their
conception of nexus as they decide each case that brought before them by
the Prosecutor. However, that is not the same thing as granting the Trial
Chamber unlimited discretion to act as it likes; it simply sets a standard
which the Trial Chamber must try-and may fail-to meet, because each
Trial Chamber may assume that one conception of nexus, for example, a
conception the Prosecutor or another Trial Chamber, say Trial Chamber
I, has or acts on, is different from that, for instance, Trial Chamber II has
or acts on.
When the different Trial Chambers of the Tribunal, the
Prosecutor or the Defense, appeal to the concept of nexus in a particular
way, each understands that each may have its own conception, but each
party will hold this conception only as its own theory of how the
standard it sets must be met, so that when the theory changes, the
standard has not.
On the other hand, assume that the Security Council laid down a
particular conception of a nexus that the Trial Chambers must apply. The
Security Council would have done this, for example, if it had listed acts
that constitute a nexus, specified controversial situations that could arise
and provided an explicit theory for determining the nexus. The difference
in this case is a difference not just in the detail of the instructions given
by the Security Council, but in the kind of instructions that the Security
Council gave to the Trial Chambers. Thus, when the Trial Chambers
appeal to the concept of a nexus, it must be construed that the Chambers
appeal to what nexus, as formulated by the Security Council, means, and
the Trial Chambers give their views on that issue no special standing.
However, when the Trial Chambers lay down a conception of a nexus,
the Chambers lay down what it means by nexus, its interpretation of a
nexus, and the views of the Chambers are the heart of the matter.
This distinction is important, and should, therefore, be taken into
account, in unraveling why and how the Trial Chambers reach its
decisions, when deciding cases that involve the determination of the
existence, or lack thereof, of a nexus between war crimes and armed
conflict under Article 4 of the Statute.
I. The ICTR Jurisprudence
A. An overview ofArticle 4 of the Statute
Article 4 of the Statute authorizes the Tribunal to prosecute
persons who committed serious violations of Common Article 3,
Additional Protocol II ("Protocol II"), and the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions, in the Rwanda internal armed conflict that took place
between January 1 and December 31 of 1994.11 Significantly, Article 4
I 1 S. RES. 955, supra note 9, art. 4: Article 4 of the Statute reads:
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of the Statute makes two new innovations. First, it criminalizes Common
Article 3. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions, or customary international
law, do not criminalize Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II.
Second, Article 4 of the Statute includes within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Tribunal Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions regardless of the fact that Protocol II is not universally
recognized as forming part of customary international law.
A report by the United Nations Secretary General published after
the adoption of the Statute rationalized the inclusion within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as legal norms regardless of whether
they were recognized as part of customary international law, or whether
they have customarily entailed individual criminal responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime under Article 4 of the Statute. The report reads in
part as follows:
"The Security Council elected to take a more expansive approach to
the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("the ICTY") and included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the ICTR international instruments regardless of whether they were
considered part of customary international law or whether they have
customarily entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime. Article 4 of the statute, accordingly,
includes violations of Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has
not yet been universally recognized as part of customary
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol It thereto of 8 June 1977.
These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any of corporal punishment;
(b) Collective punishment;
(c) Taking hostages;
(d) Acts of terrorism;
(e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(f) Pillage;
(g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized people;
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing.
See UN Doc.S/RES/955, annex (1994)
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international law, and for the first time criminalizes common Article
3 ... " 12[Emphasis added]
By "electing to take a more expansive approach to the choice of
applicable law than the one underlying the Statute of the ICTY," the
Security Council appears to have authorized the Trial Chambers of the
Tribunal to also adopt a more expansive view of Article 4 including an
expansive definition of a nexus between war crimes and internal armed
conflict,13 and the Trial Chambers have therefore liberally interpreted
issues that relate to Common Article 3 and Protocol II.
In Kayishema & Ruzindana, for example, the Trial Chamber first
noted that Common Article 3 and Protocol II were indisputably in force
in Rwanda at the time, as Rwanda became a Party to the Conventions of
1949 on May 5, 1964 and to Protocol II on November 19, 1984,14 and
thereafter that as all offences enumerated in Article 4 of the Statute also
constituted offences under the laws of Rwanda, there was no doubt that
persons responsible for the breaches of these international instruments
during the events in the Rwanda territories in 1994 could be subject to
prosecution. 5  These findings were affirmed in Rutaganda. 16 The
applicable law with regards to the crimes committed in Rwanda prior to
the adoption of Article 4 by the Security Council is therefore not ex post
facto.
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber acknowledged the binding nature
of the obligation as well, but focused upon customary international law
as the source of this obligation rather than treaty law. With regards to
Common Article 3 specifically, the Trial Chamber held that the "norms
of Common Article 3 had acquired the status of customary law in that
most states, by their domestic penal codes, have criminalized acts which
if committed during internal armed conflict, would constitute violations
of Common Article 3."17
12 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph5 of Security Council Resolution 955, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., at parag. 12, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995).
13 In making this submission, the principle of legality is indeed taken into account. It is important
that criminal acts are defined clearly and precisely. However, it is important to recognize that the
Security Council was dealing with massive and systematic killings, the type of crimes organized by
the Rwanda state, its agents including the military and other organized armed groups created and
supported by the state. The criminal acts alleged to have been committed by the individuals in the
Rwanda internal armed conflict go beyond the scope of national criminal law.
14 The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgment, ICTR-95-1-T at para. 56-
158 (May 21, 1999).
15 Id.
16 Rutaganda, I.C.T.R. 96-3-T at 90.
17 Akayesu, 1.C.T.R. 96-4-T at 608.
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The ICTR jurisprudence is consistent with the view of the ICTY
Trial Chambers 8 and the ICTY Appeals Chambers 19 stipulating that
Common Article 3, beyond a doubt, form part of customary international
law.
With respect to Protocol II, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu stated
that although not all of Protocol II could be said to be customary law, the
guarantees contained in Article 4(2), which re-affirm and supplement
Common Article 3, form part of existing customary international law.20
All of the norms reproduced in Article 4 of the Statute are covered by
Article 4 of the Statute are also covered by Article 4(2) of Protocol II.
It is submitted that the Trial Chambers have, consistent with the
Security Council's expansive approach of interpreting Article 4 of the
Statute, interpreted expansively the law applicable to internal armed
conflict. Therefore, it is suggested that it is prudent for the Trial
Chamber, when considering the existence, or lack thereof, of a nexus
between war crimes and armed conflict, to interpret Article 4
expansively because, inter alia, Common Article 3 does not in itself
define "armed conflict not of an international character."
In Musema, for instance, when dealing with the lack of
definition of "armed conflict not of an international character," the Trial
Chamber noted that the expression "armed conflict" introduces two
important material conditions to be satisfied. First, the requirement of the
existence of open hostilities between armed forces, which are organized
to a greater or lesser degree. 2' Second, the existence of situations in
which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed
groups within the territory of a single state.
22
In circumstances where the material requirements of
applicability of Protocol II are met, it follows that those requirements
also satisfy the threshold of the broader Common Article 3. The
conditions to be met in order to satisfy the requirements of applicability
of Protocol II at the time of the events alleged in Rwanda between
January 1 and July 17 1994 are: first, that an armed conflict took place in
Rwanda, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
armed groups and secondly, that the dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups were under responsible command, able to
exercise such control over a part of their territory as to enable them to
18 Dusko Tadic, IT-94-I (May 7, 1997).
19 See The Tadic Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction of Oct. 2,
1995.
20 Akayesu, I.C.T.R. at 610.
21 Musema, I.C.T.R. at 248.
22 See Trial Chamber cited ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol 11, paragraph 4338-4341, in
support of its decision.
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carry out sustained and concerted military operations, and able to
implement Protocol 11.23 The Protocol applies automatically as soon as
the material conditions, as defined in Article 1 of Protocol II, are
fulfilled.
When the conditions under Common Article 3 and Protocol II, as
incorporated in Article 4 of the Statute, are established, the Prosecutor
must proceed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is nexus
between the offence committed and the armed conflict before the
culpable acts committed by the accused will be held to be in serious
violation of Article 4 of the Statute.
1. The Prosecutor v Akayesu
Jean-Paul Akayesu, the accused, served as bourgmestre of Taba
Commune from April 1993 until June 1994. Prior to his appointment as
bourgmestre, Akayesu was a teacher and school inspector in Taba
Commune.
As bourgmestre, Akayesu was responsible for the performance
of executive functions and the maintenance of public order within his
commune, subject to the authority of the Prefect. Akayesu had exclusive
control over the communal police, as well as any gendarmes put at the
disposition of the commune. He was responsible for the execution of
laws and regulations and the administration of justice, subject only to the
Prefect's authority.
In the indictment, the Prosecutor alleged, inter alia, that between
April 7 and the end of June 1994 hundreds of displaced civilians sought
refuge at the bureau communal. The majority of these displaced civilians
were Tutsi. While seeking refuge at the bureau communal, female
displaced civilians were regularly taken by armed local militia or
communal police and subjected to sexual violence, or beaten on or near
the bureau communal premises. Displaced civilians were also murdered
frequently on or near the bureau communal premises. Many women were
forced to endure multiple acts of sexual violence, which were at times
committed by more than one assailant. These acts of sexual violence
were generally accompanied by explicit threats to death or bodily harm.
The female displaced civilians lived in constant fear of their physical and
psychological health, and such health deteriorated as a result of the
sexual violence, beatings or killings. Akayesu encouraged these
24activities.
On or about April 19, 1994, before dawn, in Gishyeshye sector,
Taba Commune, a group of men, one of whom was named Francis
Ndimubanzi, killed a local teacher, Sylvere Karera, because he was
accused of associating with the Rwanda Patriotic Front ("RPF") and
23 See Article 1 of Protocol I1.
24 Akayesu, I.C.T.R. 96-4-T at 12 A and 12B.
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plotting to kill Hutus. One of the persons alleged to be associated with
the RPF was turned over to Akayesu, but he failed to take measures to
have him arrested or to investigate the allegation of association with the
RPF.25 The morning of April 19, 1994, following the killing of Sylvere
Karera, the accused led a meeting in Gishyeshye sector at which he
sanctioned the death of Sylevere Karera and urged the population to
eliminate accomplices of the RPF, which was understood by those
present to mean the Tutsi. Over 100 people were present at the meeting.
The killing of Tutsis in Taba Commune began shortly after the
26
meeting.
At the same meeting in Gishyeshye sector on April 19, 1994,
Akayesu named at least three prominent Tutsis who had to be killed
because of their alleged relationships with the RPF. Later that day, two
of the three persons named by Akayesu as persons with relationships
with the RPF were killed, one at Kanyinya, and the other in front of the
Taba bureau communal.27
In determining Akayesu's individual criminal responsibility for
the alleged crimes, and whether Akayesu's culpable acts formed a nexus
with the internal armed conflict that took place between the RPF
dissident force and the Rwanda Army ("FAR"), the Trial Chamber made
two observations. First, that:
"The Indictment does not specifically aver that the accused falls in
the class of persons who may be held responsible for serious
violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. It has
not been alleged that the accused was officially a member of the
Rwanda 'armed forces' (in its broadest sense). It could, hence, be
objected that, as a civilian, Article 4 of the Statute, which concerns
the law of armed conflict, does not apply to him."
28
Having made that observation, the Trial Chamber continued:
"For Akayesu to be held criminally responsible under Article 4 of
the Statute, it is incumbent on the Prosecutor to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Akayesu acted for either the Government or
the RPF in the execution of their respective objectives. Akayesu
25 Id. at 13.
26 Id. at 14.
27 Id. at 15.
28 Id. at 632; however, the Trial Chamber proceeds to state: "It is, in fact, well-established, at least
since the Tokyo Trials, that civilians may be held responsible for violations of international
humanitarian law. Hirota, the former Foreign Minister of Japan, was convicted at Tokyo for crimes
committed during the rape of Nanking. Other post-World War 1I trials unequivocally support the
imposition of individual criminal liability for crimes on civilians where they have a link or
connection with a Party to the conflict. The principle of holding civilians liable for breaches of the
laws of war is, moreover, favoured by a consideration of the humanitarian object and purpose of the
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, which is to protect war victims from atrocities."
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would incur criminal responsibility for his acts if it were proved that
by virtue of his authority, he is either responsible for the outbreak
of, or is otherwise directly engaged in the conduct of hostilities.
Hence the Prosecutor will have to demonstrate and prove that
Akayesu was either a member of the armed forces under the
military command of either of the belligerent parties, or that he was
legitimately mandated and expected, as a public official or agent or
person otherwise holding public authority or de facto representing
the Government, to support or fulfill the war efforts." 29 [Emphasis
added]
The second observation made by the Trial Chamber was that the
Prosecutor must establish a link, or nexus, between the war crimes
allegedly committed by Akayesu and the internal armed conflict. In
discharging this burden, the Trial Chamber stated:
"The Prosecutor must prove that there is a nexus between the
actions of the accused and the conflict. The Prosecutor must
produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate how and in what
capacity the accused was supporting the Government efforts against
a dissident armed force or other armed force." 30 [Emphasis added]
These are, prima facie, the benchmarks against which the
evidence adduced by the Prosecutor must be judged in discharging the
burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt.
According to the record of the trial proceedings, testimony
presented by the Prosecutor and admitted into evidence established that
at the time of the events alleged in the indictment, Akayesu embodied the
communal authority and that he held an executive civilian position in
Taba Commune. At the time the crimes alleged in the indictment were
committed, Akayesu wore a military jacket and openly carried a rifle.
Akayesu also assisted the military on their arrival in Taba Commune by
undertaking a number of tasks including reconnaissance and mapping the
Commune, and the setting up of radio communications. Further, Akayesu
allowed the military to use his office premises in support of the war
efforts.
Akayesu's conduct constitutes a prima facie act of war. Under
the laws of war, support for a third party's act of war shall generally be
rated as an act of war of the supporting party if it is related to measures
harmful to the adversary. 31 Akayesu's war efforts in support of the FAR
against the RPF, both being the principal parties to the internal armed
29 Id. at 640.
30 Id. at 641.
31 CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, AT 50 (Oxford University Press, 1995).
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conflict in Rwanda, may be construed as acts of war in support of a third
party and harmful to the adversary.
Further, under the laws of war, irregular forces or unlawful
combatants, under a proper command or deploying preparatory to attack,
and wear identifiable marks, military uniforms or openly carry guns are
deemed combatants and parties to armed conflict. 32 Akayesu wore a
military uniform and openly carried a rifle.
It is submitted that the Prosecutor rightly relied in part on the
facts admitted in evidence by the Trial Chamber to demonstrate that
there was a nexus between the actions of Akayesu and the internal armed
conflict. Further, the trial record shows that the Prosecutor argued that
reference by Akayesu to individuals as Rwanda Patriotic Front ("RPF")
accomplices was indicative of Akayesu's intention to connect his actions
to the conflict between the Interim Government, the FAR and the RPF.
Akayesu, by conduct and intent, having allied himself to the Interim
Government forces, the FAR, a party to the internal armed conflict
against the Rwanda Patriotic Army ("RPA"), the military wing of RPF,
though a civilian, was, under the laws and customs of war, a combatant
and was directly engaged in hostilities by supporting the FAR against the
RPF within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.
However, the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor's
submission and held that:
"The Prosecutor did not bring sufficient evidence to show how and
in what capacity Akayesu was supporting the Government effort
against the RPF. The evidence as pertains to the wearing of a
military jacket and the carrying of a rifle... are not sufficient in
demonstrating that Akayesu actively supported the war effort.
Furthermore, the Chamber finds that the limited assistance given to
the military by the accused in his role as the head of the Commune
does not suffice to establish that he actively supported the war
effort. Moreover, the Chamber recalls it has been proved that
references to RPF accomplices in the context of the events, which
occurred in Taba, were to be understood as meaning Tutsi."33
[Emphasis added]
The Akayesu decision that the acts or omissions of the accused
"are not sufficient in demonstrating that Akayesu actively supported the
war efforts" or evidence that the accused in his role as the head of the
commune, directly or indirectly, participated in the internal armed
conflict "does not suffice to establish that he actively supported the war
effort." It is submitted that the Trial Chamber ought to have positively
formulated the threshold for establishing a nexus between war crimes
32 L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, at 114 (Manchester University
Press, 1993).
33 Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at 642.
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and armed conflict. The Trial Chamber's rejection of the Prosecutor's
submission, in a negative form, without spelling out what must be
proved, circumvents a legal consideration of the nexus issue.
The Trial Chamber, for example, should have stated the
threshold of how and in what capacity an accused that supported the
Interim Government's, or the FAR's; war efforts against the RPF ought
to have been established by the Prosecutor. In the absence of a positive
formulation of the concept of nexus, or the Trial Chamber's criteria for
establishing a nexus, it becomes difficult for the Prosecutor to formulate
an objective criterion for challenging the Trial Chamber's decision.
2 The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana
The Akayesu decision, to the extent that there was no nexus
between war crimes and internal armed conflict, was adopted and
followed in Kayishema & Ruzindana.34
Kayishema, the first accused, like Akayesu, was a civilian.
Kayishema was appointed a Prefect of Kibuye on 3 July 1992 and acted
in that capacity until his departure to Goma in Zaire (now Democratic
Republic of Congo) in July 199431
The allegations against Kayishema are that by April 17, 1994,
thousands of men, women and children from various locations had
sought refuge in the Catholic Church and Home St. Jean complex ("the
Complex") located in Kibuye town. These men, women and children
were unarmed and were prominently Tutsis. They were in the Complex
seeking protection from attacks on the Tutsi, which had occurred
throughout the Prefecture of Kibuye. Some of the people who sought
refuge in the Complex did so because Kayishema ordered them to go
there. The Prosecutor alleged that when the accused ordered people to
the Complex, he knew or had reason to know, that an attack on the
Complex was going to occur.
36
After people gathered in the Complex, persons under
Kayishema's control, including members of the Gendarmerie Nationale
and the Interahamwe, surrounded the Complex. These persons prevented
the men, women and children within the Complex from leaving the
Complex at a time when Kayishema knew, or had reason to know, that
an attack on the Complex was going to occur.37
On or about April 17, 1994, Kayishema ordered members of the
Gendarmerie Nationale, the communal police of Gitesi commune,
members of the Interahamwe and armed civilians to attack the complex,
and he personally participated in the attack. The attackers used guns,
34 Ruzindana, ICTR-95-I-T at 130.
35 Supra note 24.
36 Id. at 25-26.
37 Id. at 27.
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grenades, machetes, spears, cudgels and other weapons to kill the people
in the Complex. The attack resulted in thousands of deaths and numerous
injuries to the people within the Complex. The Prosecutor alleged that
before the attack on the Complex, the accused did not take measures to
prevent an attack, and after the attack Kayishema did not punish the
perpetrators.38
Ruzindana, the second accused, was also a civilian and a
commercial trader in Kigali during the period in which the crimes
alleged were committed. 39 Ruzindana was jointly charged with
Kayishema for the massacres in the Area of Bisesero. The area of
Bisesero spans over two communes of the Kibuye Prefecture. From
about April 9, 1994 through June 30, 1994, thousands of men, women
and children sought refuge in the area of Bisesero. These men, women
and children were predominantly Tutsi and were seeking refuge from
attacks on Tutsi, which had occurred throughout the Prefecture of
Kibuye. The area of Bisesero was regularly attacked, on almost a daily
basis, throughout the period of about April 9, 1994 through about June
30, 1994. The attackers used guns, grenades, machetes, spears, pangas,
cudgels and other weapons to kill the Tutsis in Bisesero. At various times
the men, women and children seeking refuge in Bisesero attempted to
defend themselves from these attacks with stones, sticks and other crude
40
weapons.
The Prosecutor alleged that at various locations and times
throughout April, May and June 1994, and often in concert, Ruzindana
and Kayishema brought to the area of Bisesero members of the
Gendarmerie Nationale, communal police of Gishyita and Gisovu,
commune, Interahamwe and armed civilians, and directed them to attack
the people seeking refuge there. In addition, the Prosecutor alleged that
at various locations and times, and often in concert, Ruzindana and
Kayishema personally attacked and killed persons seeking refuge in
Bisesero. The attacks resulted in thousands of deaths and numerous
41injuries to the men, women and children within the area of Bisesero.
In the Kayishema and Ruzindana decision, the Trial Chamber,
with approval, cited Akayesu 42 and the proceedings of the Preparatory
38 Id. at 28-30.
39 Id. at 24.
40 Id. at 45-46.
41 Id. at 47-48.
42 Id. at 186. In paragraph 186 the Trial Chamber stated: "In the Akayesu Judgment, the Trial
Chamber found that '...it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that acts perpetrated by
Akayesu... were committed in conjunction with the armed conflict.' Such a conclusion means that, in
the opinion of the Chamber, such a connection is necessary."
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Commission for the International Criminal Court43 and thereafter stated
that:
"[T]he term "nexus" should not be understood as something vague
and indefinite. A direct comection between the alleged crimes,
referred to in the Indictment, and the armed conflict should be
established factually. No test, therefore, can be defined in abstracto.
It is for the Trial Chamber, on a case-by-case basis, to adjudge on
the facts submitted as to whether a nexus existed. It is incumbent
upon the Prosecutor to present those facts and to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that such a nexus exists."
44
It is good practice for the Trial Chamber to consider the
existence, or lack thereof, of a nexus between war crimes and armed
conflict on a case-by-case basis. However, as in Akayesu, the Trial
Chamber did not formulate any guideline, benchmark, or suggest the
quality of evidence the Prosecutor must adduce in order to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that such a nexus exists. It would have been useful,
particularly to the Prosecutor, had the Trial Chamber formulated a
benchmark or threshold requirement for proof of a nexus that may be
applied on a case-by-case basis. This approach would assist both the
Prosecutor and the Defense Counsel in conceptualizing, and
simultaneously providing, the criteria for assessing the quality of
evidence that may prove the existence, or lack thereof, of a nexus
between war crimes and internal armed conflict.
The Trial Chamber's decision not to provide a positive definition
of the concept of nexus, nor state the threshold required, as opposed to a
negative definition of what a nexus is not, has tended to create a
subjective criteria for determining the existence, or lack thereof, of a
nexus between war crimes and internal armed conflict. For example, in
arguing that there was a nexus between the culpable acts the accused
were alleged to have committed and the internal armed conflict, the
Prosecutor had submitted:
"That the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that for each
of the alleged violations there was a nexus between the crimes and
the armed conflict that was underway in Rwanda. The Tutsis who
were massacred in Kibuye went to the four sites seeking refuge
from attacks that were occurring on the Tutsis throughout Kibuye
and Rwanda. These attacks were occurring because hostilities had
broken out between the RPF and the FAR and the Tutsis were being
43 M. at 187. In paragraph 187 the Trial Chamber states: "This issue was discussed recently at the
first session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (16 to 26 February
1999). From the point of view of the participants, war crimes would occur if the criminal conduct
took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict." (Second Discussion Paper-
PCNICC/ 999/WGE/RT/.2).
44 Id. at 188.
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sought out on the pretext that they were accomplices of the RPF and
were 'the enemy' and/or were responsible for the death of the
President.,
45
The Trial Chamber, not having formulated a clear concept of a
nexus, subjectively rejected the Prosecutor submission without
suggesting any guideline on how the concept of a nexus must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt, or why the Prosecutor did not
discharge the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, in rejecting the Prosecutor's submission, the Trial
Chamber advanced four unpersuasive reasons. First, that the Tutsi were
attacked by neither the RPF nor the FAR in the places where they sought
refuge in Kibuye but by the civilian authorities as a result of a campaign
to exterminate the Tutsi population in the country. Consequently the
Chamber held: "there [was] no ground to assert that there was a nexus
between the committed crimes and the armed conflict. 46 Second, the
Trial Chamber held that while it was true that hostilities had broken out
between the RPF and the FAR during this period of time, the Prosecutor
did not produce evidence that the military operations that occurred in
Kibuye Prefecture when the alleged crimes were committed were
connected with armed conflict. Third, the Trial Chamber held that the
Prosecutor did not show that there was a direct link between crimes
committed against these victims and the hostilities mentioned by the
Prosecutor. Fourth, the Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor did not
prove that the victims were accomplices of the RPF and/or were
responsible for the death of the President.
The Trial Chamber's conclusion is apparently based on its
subjective interpretation of the term "pretext." In rejecting the
Prosecutor's submission and her reference to the word "pretext" in
describing the Tutsi civilians as accomplices, the Trial Chamber
observed:
"The Prosecutor herself recognized that the Tutsis were being
sought out on the pretext that they were accomplices etc. These
allegations show only that the armed conflict had been used as
pretext to unleash an official policy of genocide. Therefore, such
allegations cannot be considered as evidence of a direct link
between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict."47[Emphasis in
the original]
While the Trial Chamber cannot be faulted on its conclusion in
respect of crimes of genocide, its conclusion that "these allegations show
only that the armed conflict had been used as a pretext to unleashed an
official policy of genocide" is not the only inference that may be drawn
45 Id. at 601.
46 Id. at 602.
47 Id. at 603.
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from the Prosecutor's use of the term "pretext." On the contrary, the term
"pretext" could mean that the accused decided to kill Tutsi civilians
before they could be recruited and trained by the RPF to fight the FAR
regardless of whether or not the Tutsi civilians were in fact accomplices
of the RPF. This form of killing would be directed at Tutsi civilians
considered fit for military duties. Thus, this preemptive strike, or reprisal,
would have as its objective the killing of all Tutsi civilians for the simple
reason that they are, or may be, potential allies, spies or agents, and
therefore accomplices, of the RPF. Acts of reprisal, under the laws of
war, are generally considered war crimes.
From an objective point of view, the assumption may be false
because while some Tutsi civilians, given an opportunity for recruitment
and extending support to the war efforts of the RPF, may in fact, accept
recruitment and play a direct role in supporting the war effort of the RPF,
there is no certainty, based on an objective assessment, that all Tutsi
civilians, given similar opportunity, would opt to support the war efforts
of the RPF against the FAR and therefore fit the classification of
accomplices. The possibility that some Tutsi civilians might choose to
remain neutral will always exist. Yet, the fact that the possibility of
neutrality exists as an option for the Tutsi civilians, would not stop the
Interahamwe from targeting for killing, all Tutsi civilians on the baseless
assumption that the Tutsi civilians are accomplices of the RPF when in
fact not. Consequently, the killing of some Tutsi civilians would
constitute a war crime, while the killing of other Tutsi civilians would
constitute crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity. This is one
interpretation to the Prosecutor's use of the term "pretext.
48
Second, the term "pretext" as used by the Prosecutor could mean
that while some Tutsi civilians were in fact accomplices of the RPF,
many other Tutsi civilians were not, but the accused decided to target all
Tutsi civilians for elimination regardless of whether they were actually
accomplices or not. In this context, the term "pretext" was used in
justifying the killing of only Tutsis who were not accomplices of the
RPF. The killing of Tutsi civilians who were accomplices would
constitute war crimes, and those who were not accomplices, would
constitute crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity because same
set of acts may disclose two or more crimes under the Statute.49
48 This argument does not affect a charge on a count of genocide since the same set of facts would
disclose war crimes and crimes of genocide. Further, the ICTR Statute does not provide a hierarchy
of crimes hence while genocide is a very serious crime, it does not necessarily take precedence of
war crimes. The Trial Chamber may therefore convict an accused on war crimes and crime of
genocide.
49 However, the flaw in the Prosecutor's case in respect of this line of interpretation is her failure to
adduce evidence of participation of Tutsi civilian accomplices in the internal armed conflict. It is not
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The Trial Chamber's strict interpretation, or subjective use, of
the term "pretext" appears to have been rooted in the ambiguous manner
in which the Trial Chamber used the term "nexus" throughout its
judgment, and consequently did not pay the necessary attention to the
pivotal role played by members or leaders of the Interahamwe,
particularly in killing those Tutsi civilians who were in fact accomplices,
spies or agents of the RPF.
3 The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda
In the Rutaganda case, the Trial Chamber followed the Akayesu
and Kayishema & Ruzindana precedents. Rutaganda was general
manager and proprietor of Rutaganda SARL. He was also a member of
the National and Prefectorial Committees of the Mouvement Republicain
National pour le Developpement et la Democratie ("the MRND") and a
shareholder of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines ("the RTLM").
On April 6, 1994, he was serving as the second vice president of the
National Committee of the Interhamwe, the youth militia of the MRND
political party.5"
The allegations against Rutaganda are that on or about April 6,
1994 the accused distributed guns and other weapons to members of
Interahamwe in Nyarugenge commune of Kigali. On or about April 10,
1994, the accused stationed members of Interahamwe at roadblocks near
his office at the "Amgar" garage in Kigali. Shortly after the accused left
the area, the members of Interhamwe started checking identity cards of
people passing the roadblock. The Interhamwe ordered persons with
Tutsi identity cards to stand on one side of the road. Eight persons
identified as Tutsi were killed. The victims included men, women,
children and an infant who was carried on the back of one of the Tutsi
women. 51
In April 1994, on a date unknown, Tutsis who had been
separated at a roadblock in front of the Amgar garage were taken to
Rutaganda and questioned by him. Thereafter, the accused directed that
these Tutsis be detained with others at a nearby building. Later, the
accused directed the Interhamwe under his control to take 10 Tutsi
detainees to a deep, open hole near the Amgar garage. On the order of
the accused, the Interahamwe killed the 10 Tutsi civilians with machetes
and threw their bodies into the hole. 2
From April 7 to April 11, 1994, thousands of unarmed Tutsi
men, women and children and some unarmed Hutus sought refuge at the
sufficient to allege accomplice participation, the Prosecutor must identify and prove that the victim
of an alleged crime was, as a matter of fact, an accomplice.
50 Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T at 2.
51 Id. at 10-11.
52 Id. at 12.
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Ecole Technique Officielle ("ETO School") in Kicukiro sector, Kicukiro
commune. The ETO School was considered a safe haven because
Belgian soldiers, part of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda forces (hereafter UNAMIR), were stationed there. On or about
April 11, 1994, immediately after the Belgians withdrew from the ETO
school, members of FAR, the gendarmerie and militia, including the
Interahamwe, attacked the ETO school and, using machetes and guns,
killed the people who had sought refuge there. The Interahamwe
separated Hutus from Tutsis during the attack, killing Tutsis. The
accused participated in the attack at the ETO school, which resulted in
the deaths of a large number of Tutsis.5 3
Rutaganda, using members of the Interhamwe, forcibly
transferred the men, women and children who survived the ETO school
attack, to a gravel pit near Nyanza primary school. More members of the
Interahamwe converged upon Nyanza primary school and surrounded the
group of survivors. The survivors who were able to prove that they were
Hutu were permitted to leave the gravel pit. Tutsis who presented altered
identity cards were immediately killed. Most of the remainder of the
group of survivors were attacked and killed by grenades or shot to death.
Those who tried to escape were attacked with machetes. The accused,
among others, directed and participated in the attacks.54
In April 1994, on dates unknown, in Masango commune,
Rutaganda and others unknown to the Prosecutor, conducted house-to-
house searches for Tutsis and their families. Throughout these searches,
Tutsis were separated from Hutus and taken to a river. The accused
instructed the Interahamwe to track all the Tutsi and throw them into the
river. On or about April 28, the accused, together with members of the
Interahamwe collected Tutsi residents in Kigali and detained them near
Amgar garage. The accused and the Interahamwe demanded identity
cards from the detainees. A number of persons, including Emmanuel
Kayitare, were forcibly separated from the group. Later that day,
Emmanuel Kayitare attempted to flee from where he was being detained
and the accused pursued him, caught him and struck him on the head
with a machete and killed him. In June 1994, on a date unknown, the
accused ordered people to bury the bodies of victims in order to conceal
his crimes.55
In considering the case against Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber
quoted Akayesu with approval. The relevant part read:
"In addition to the offence being committed in the context of armed
conflict not of an international character satisfying the material
requirements of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, there
53 Id. at 13-15.
54 Id. at 16.
55 Id. at 17-19.
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must be a nexus between the offence and the armed conflict for
Article 4 of the Statute to apply. By this it should be understood that
the offence must be closely related to the hostilities or committed in
conjunction with armed conflict. "56[Emphasis added]
Further, the Trial Chamber, with approval, cited Kayishema and
Ruzindana thus:
"The term nexus should not be defined in abstractio. Rather, the
evidence adduced in support of the charges against the accused
must satisfy the Chamber that such a nexus exists. Thus, the burden
rests on the Prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, on
the basis of the facts, such a nexus exists between the crime
committed and the armed conflict." 57[Emphasis added]
Again, as in earlier cases, the Trial Chamber did not formulate
the benchmark, nor the quality of the evidence the Prosecutor must
adduce in order to discharge the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a nexus exists between war crimes and internal armed
conflict.
As regards the testimony presented by the Prosecutor and
admitted in evidence, the Trial Chamber accepted that the victims of the
offences were unarmed civilians, men, women and children who had
been identified as "targets" on the basis of their ethnicity. Those persons
who had carried weapons were disarmed by the UNAMIR troops on
entering the ETO compound. The Trial Chamber did not consider that
the bearing of these weapons prior to being disarmed deprived the
victims of the protection afforded to them by Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II. Indeed, the Chamber was of the opinion that these
"armed" civilians were not taking a direct part in hostilities, but rather
finds that bearing of these weapons was a desperate and futile attempt at
survival against the thousands of armed assailants.5 8 Consequently, the
Chamber ruled that it was satisfied that the Tutsi civilians were persons
taking no active part in the hostilities and were thus protected persons
under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.
The Trial Chamber also admitted into evidence the Prosecutor's
testimony that as second vice-president of the Interahamwe, being the
youth wing of the majority political party in the Interim Government in
April 1994, the accused was in a position of authority vis-d-vis the
Interahamwe and therefore falls within the category of persons who can
be held individually responsible, under Article 6(3), for serious
violations of Article 4 of the Statute. This conclusion, the Trial Chamber
observed, is supported by evidence indicating that the accused exerted
control over the Interahamwe, that he distributed weapons to them during
56 Id. at 104.
57 Id. at 105.
58 Id. at 437.
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the events alleged in the Indictment, aiding and abetting in the
commission of the crimes and directly participating in the massacres with
the Interahamwe. Significantly, the Trial Chamber admitted in evidence
the Prosecutor's testimony that "the Interhamwe served in a supporting
capacity, the FAR against the RPF, and that there was a nexus between
the crimes committed by the accused and the armed conflict."'5 9
However, the Trial Chamber pointed out that although the
genocide against the Tutsis and the conflict between the FAR and the
RPF are undeniably linked, the Prosecutor couldn't merely rely on a
finding of genocide and consider that, as such, serious violations of
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are therefore automatically
established. Rather, "the Prosecutor must discharge her burden by
establishing that each material requirement of offences under Article 4 of
the Statute is met. ' 60 The Trial Chamber, therefore, held that "it had not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt that there existed a nexus between
the culpable acts committed by the accused and the armed conflict."
61
Consequently the Chamber found the accused not guilty as charged.
4 The Prosecutor v. Musema
Alfred Musema was a civilian and the Director of Gisovu Tea
Factory, a public enterprise. He was also a member of the "Conseil
prefectorial" in Buyumba Prefecture and a member of Technical
Committee in the Butare Commune. Both positions of responsibility
involved socio-economic and developmental matters and did not focus
on Prefectorial politics. Though the Head Office of the Gisovu Tea
Factory was located in Kibuye, Musema's area of responsibility
encompassed the Prefectures of Kibuye and Gikongoro.62
In the indictment, Musema was charged with, inter alia, serious
violations of Common Article and Protocol II, as incorporated in Article
4 of the Statute. The Prosecutor alleged that during the months of April,
May and June 1994, in Gisovu and Gishyita communes, Kibuye
Prefecture in the Territory of Rwanda, did commit or ordered others to
commit crimes. In support of the allegations, the Prosecutor averred in
the concise statement of facts that at various occasions and times
throughout April, May and June 1994, and often in concert with others,
Musema brought to the area of Bisesero armed individuals and directed
them to attack the people seeking refuge there.63
59 Id. at 440.
60 Id. at 443.
61 Id. at 444.
62 Musema, ICTR-96-13-I at 10-16.
63 See, Musema, ICTR-96-13-I at 44-45.(Annex A). The area of Bisesero spans two communes in
the Kibuye Prefecture. From about 9 April 1994 through 30 June 1994, thousands of men, women
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The Prosecutor alleged that Musema committed acts of rape and
encouraged others to capture, rape and kill Tutsi women seeking refuge
from attacks within the area of Bisesero in Gisovu and Gisgyita
communes, Kibuye Perfecture. In addition, the Prosecutor alleged that at
various locations and times, and often in concert with others, Musema
personally attacked and killed persons seeking refuge in Bisisero;
specifically that on April 14, 1994, Musema, in concert with others,
ordered and encouraged the raping of Annunciata, a Tutsi woman and
thereafter, ordered, that she be killed together with her son Blaise. On
May 13, 1994, Musema in concert with others, raped and killed
Immaculee Mukankasi, a pregnant Tutsi and thereafter ordered others
accompanying him, to rape and kill Tutsi women seeking refuge from
attack; and on the same day, Musema, acting in concert with others,
raped Nyiramusugi, a Tutsi woman and encouraged others
accompanying him to rape and kill her.64 The attacks described above
resulted in thousands of deaths and numerous injuries to men, women
and children within the area of Bisesero in Gisovu and Gishyita
communes, Kibuye Perfecture.65
In the judgment, the Trial Chamber adopted its earlier reasoning
in Akayesu, Kayishema & Ruzindana and Rutaganda and therefore
neither defined, nor formulated a benchmark for determining the concept
or conception of a nexus between war crimes and armed conflict. The
Trial Chamber observed that the burden rests on the Prosecutor to
establish, on the basis of the evidence adduced during trial, that there
exists a nexus, on the one hand, between the acts for which Musema is
individually criminally responsible, including those for which he is
individually criminally responsible as a superior, and, on the other, the
armed conflict.66 In the opinion of the Chamber, the Prosecutor failed to
establish that there was a nexus.67 Consequently the Chamber found that
Musema was not guilty for violations of Common Article 3 and Protocol
11.68
and children sought refuge in various locations in Bisesero. These men, women and children were
predominantly Tutsi and were seeking refuge from attacks on Tutsi which had occurred throughout
the Prefecture of Kibuye. The individuals seeking in the Bisesiro were regularly attacked, throughout
the period of about 9 April through about 30 June 1994. The attackers used guns, grenades,
machetes, spears, pangas, cudgels and other weapons to kill the Tutsis in Bisesero.
64 Id. at 4.4-4.10 (Annex A).
65 Id. at 4.10 (Annex).
66 Id. at 974.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 975
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B. The Concept of Nexus
In Akayesu, Kayishema & Ruzindana, Rutaganda and Musema,
different Trial Chambers of the Tribunal that presided over the cases did
not provide positive definition of the concept of nexus between war
crimes and armed conflict. Further, the different Trial Chambers did not
consider the different conceptions of nexus between war crimes and
internal armed conflict.
The Trial Chambers of the ICTY, in deciding cases that involved
consideration of the law applicable to the internal aspect of the
international armed conflict of the former Yugoslavia, also declined to
formulate or define a positive concept of a nexus between war crimes
and internal armed conflict.
In Dusko Tadic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, for instance,
made the formulation that: "The only question to be determined in the
circumstances of each individual case was whether the offence were
closely related to the armed conflict as a whole." 69 [Emphasis added].
The Trial Chamber did not suggest any criteria for a determination,
"whether the offence is closely related to the internal armed conflict as a
whole."
Similarly, in Zejil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and
Esad Landzo (hereafter Celebrici) the Trial Chamber of the ICTY
without formulating or defining the concept or conception of a nexus
between war crimes and internal armed conflict simply substituted the
phrase "closely related to armed conflict as a whole" used in Tadic with
"an obvious link." The Trial Chamber stated, "There must be an obvious
link between the criminal act and the armed conflict."7° [Emphasis
added].
Therefore, according to the ICTY, the term nexus may mean
"closely related to the armed conflict as a whole,"as used in Tadic, or "an
obvious link between the criminal act and the armed conflict," as used in
Celebici. In the absence of a definition or a formulation of the concept of
a nexus, such general description is legally unhelpful because the
thresholds for proof of a nexus beyond a reasonable doubt is vague and
undefined.
The Trial Chamber of the ICTR did make an interesting
observation:
"When the country is in a state of armed conflict, crimes comnitted
in this period of time could be considered as having been committed
in the context of armed conflict. However, it does not mean that all
such crimes have a direct link with the armed conflict and all the
69The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTR-94-I-T at 573 (May 7, 1997).
70 The Prosecutor v. Pavo and Zenga, ICTR-96-21 at 193 (Nov. 16, 1998).
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victims of these crimes are victims of armed conflict."71[Emphasis
added]
Thus, it is reasonable to infer that in the Rwanda internal armed
conflict and the killing of some Tutsi civilians by members or leaders of
the Interahamwe, constitute a nexus between war crimes and internal
armed conflict, and are therefore war crimes, while the killing of other
Tutsi civilians may not constitute war crimes but crimes of genocide or
crimes against humanity. This interpretation would be consistent with the
Prosecutor's use of the term "pretext" in her submission in the
Rutaganda case.
The Trial Chamber's unsuccessful attempt at justifying its
decision in Kayishema & Ruzindana, appears to be based on the
ambiguous definition of the concept of nexus, and subsequently the Trial
Chamber's finding that while the Tutsi civilians went to sites seeking
refuge from attacks that were occurring on the Tutsis throughout Kibuye
and Rwanda, the Tutsi civilians were attacked by neither the RPF nor by
the FAR, is inconsistent with the testimony presented by the Prosecutor
and admitted in evidence by the Trial Chamber.72 Further, the Trial
Chamber's conclusion that there was no ground to assert that there was a
nexus between the crimes committed and the internal armed conflict that
took place at the time, but that the crimes were committed as a result of a
campaign to exterminate the Tutsi population in the country, resulting in
genocide, which was not directly connected with the internal armed
conflict, is not supported by the testimony presented by the Prosecutor
and admitted in evidence by the Trial Chamber.73
It is submitted that in reaching the above conclusions, the Trial
Chamber did not take into account, inter alia, the fact that the number of
Tutsi civilians killed by the FAR and the Interahamwe increased
proportionately in relation to the loss the FAR suffered at the hands of
the RPF in the course of the armed conflict. The FAR routinely carried
out reprisals against the Tutsi civilians after suffering defeats at the
hands of the RPF in combat.74 Thus, the killing of Tutsi civilians
constituted crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity, were also
linked to the internal armed conflict, and thus constituted war crimes.
The same set of acts or omissions committed by members or leaders of
the Interahamwe resulted in violations of Articles 2, 3 or 4 of the Statute,
71 Ruzindana, ICTR 95-1-T at 600.
72 Id. at 602.
73 Id.
74 The fact that the FAR routinely carried out reprisals against the Tutsi civilians after suffering
defeats at the hands of the RPF in combat places a duty on the Prosecutor to adduce evidence of
Tutsi civilian accomplices and link that evidence with proof that the Tutsi civilians were killed
because they were RPF accomplices.
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that is, the commission of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity
or war crimes.
The findings and conclusions of the Trial Chambers in Akayesu,
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Rutaganda,and Musema, inter alia, that it did
not follow from participation of the accused, as members or leaders of
the Interahamwe in these massacres that the culpable acts were
connected with the FAR or other organized-armed groups; that there was
insufficient evidence adduced by the Prosecutor to prove that the crimes
were committed against the RPF and/or its accomplices, and that the
civilian authorities of Rwanda Interim Government, particularly the
members and leaders of the Interahamwe committed crimes against the
Tutsi ethnic group, not because of the armed conflict, but as a result of
the implementation of the policy of genocide by the Interim Government
of Rwanda in 1994 ignore the active role the Interahamwe played in
supporting the FAR and the Interim Government in the war against the
RPF, and goes against historical facts and conventional wisdom.75
In deciding as it did, the Trial Chamber appears to not only have
overlooked the active military and political support the accused extended
to the FAR, but it also did not carefully evaluate the fact that the FAR
trained and armed the Interahamwe with the sole objective of supporting
FAR against the RPF in the internal armed conflict. Had the Trial
Chamber considered and evaluated the objective of the FAR in training
and arming members or leaders of the Interahamwe, the political
philosophy of the Interim Government, the FAR, Hutu Power and its
extremist ideology, it is possible that the Trial Chamber might have
reached not only a different conclusion, but also defined the concept of
nexus liberally, particularly if the Trial Chambers had considered the
intention behind the adoption of Article 4 of the Statute, and the fact that
the Security Council elected to adopt an expansive approach with regard
to interpretation of Article 4. Further, it would have been useful had the
Trial Chambers taken time to consider whether the Security Council had
in mind the punishment of persons who participated in the armed
conflicts, particularly the role of members or leaders of Interahamwe
when it adopted Article 4 of the Statute.
C. The Interahamwe
Considering the pivotal role played by members or leaders of the
Interahamwe in the internal armed conflict that took place in Rwanda
from January 1 to December 31, 1994 between the FAR and the RPF,
can the Interahamwe, as an institution, be considered a party to the armed
75 See GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE, (Hurst, 1995);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY" GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (Human
Rights Watch, New York, International Federation of Human Rights, Paris, 1999); AFRICAN
RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE (Africa Rights, London, Revised 1995 Edition).
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conflict under the laws and customs of war? In other words, do members
or leaders of the Interahamwe satisfy the legal requirements for
classification as lawful combatants, unlawful combatants or parties to the
internal armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 3 or
Protocol II, as incorporated in Article 4 of the Statute? Further, based on
the acts or omissions of members or leaders of the Interahame before or
during the armed conflict, was the Interahamwe, as an institution, a party
organ of the MRND, an agent, or a de facto representative of the Interim
Government or the FAR, and supported the war efforts against the RPF,
violated Article 4 of the Statute?
Under customary international law, a member of an "armed
force" is defined as including the army properly so called, including the
militia, the national guards and other armed bodies which fulfill the
following conditions: (a) that they are under the direction of a
responsible command; (b) that they must have a uniform, or a fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, and worn by individuals
composing such corps; (c) that they carry their arms openly.76
The Third Geneva Convention defines members of the "armed
forces" to include: members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own
territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteers corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill
the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly and (d)
that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.77
Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions defines "armed forces" to include the regular armed forces
of a High Contracting Party, dissident armed forces, or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control
76 See Green, supra note 32 at p.103-104.
77 Article 4(2) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12
August, 1949. See also Knut Ipsen, "Combatants and Non-combatants" in Dieter Fleck (ed.,) THE
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, at 70 (Oxford University Press, 1995):
"The armed forces of a party to a conflict consist of all its organized armed forces, groups, and units.
They also include militias and voluntary corps integrated in the armed forces. The armed forces shall
be:
under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates, and
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance
with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict (Art.43 (I) of
Additional Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.)
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over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement Protocol II.
Thus, under the laws and customs of war, the term "armed
forces" is so broadly defined as to cover the Interahamwe as an
organized armed group. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the
Interahamwe, inter alia had a clear and defined command structure, with
Rutaganda, the accused as its national vice-president. Although prior to
the armed conflict the Interahamwe was a civilian youth wing of the
MRND political party, it was later militarily trained and armed by the
FAR and the Interim Government.
After completing military training, the members or leaders of the
Interahamwe, participated directly or indirectly in the internal armed
conflict, and provided military, political or propaganda in support of the
war efforts to the FAR against the RPF and its allies who were
characterized by the Interahamwe as accomplices, spies or agents
encompassing Tutsi civilians. It is submitted that the Interahamwe meets
conditions for classification as an organized armed group under the laws
and customs of war.
Under customary international law, Protocol II or the ICTR
Statute, individuals of all ranks who belong to the armed forces under the
military command of either of the belligerent parties fall within the class
of perpetrators who may be prosecuted for violating Article 4 of the
Statute. If individuals do not belong to the armed forces, in other words
they are civilians, they could still bear criminal responsibility if a nexus
exists beyond a reasonable doubt between their culpable acts and the
armed forces.
In the Akayesu, Kayishema & Ruzindana, Rutaganda and
Musema decisions, the Trial Chambers acknowledged that government
armed forces are often under the permanent supervision of public
officials, who happen to be civilians, representing the government and
have to support the war efforts and fulfill certain mandate. In Akayesu
the Trial Chamber described these types of public officials as,
"[I]ndividuals who are legitimately mandated and expected as public
officials or agents or persons otherwise holding public authority or de
facto representing the Government to support or fulfill the war efforts. 78
It is submitted that based on the above definitions, members or
leaders of the Interahamwe were members of an armed force, they wore
distinctive marks or military uniforms, openly carried arms and directly
or indirectly, participated in the armed conflict that took place in Rwanda
between January 1 and December 31, 1994.
In Akayesu, Kayishema & Ruzindana, Rutaganda and Musema,
the Trial Chambers admitted in evidence, the Prosecutor's testimony to
the effect that the Interahamwe comprise of youth who are members of
78 Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at 631.
VOL. 10
2001-2002 PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES IN RWANDA 71
the youth wing of the majority political party in government (the
MRND) and were trained and armed by FAR. The Interim Government,
the MRND political party and FAR provided guns, grenades or machetes
used by the Interahamwe. The Interahmwe was transformed by the FAR
from a civilian youth wing of MRND political party to an armed group
and an effective killing machine. The primary objective of the
Interahamwe was to provide military and political support to the Interim
Government and FAR against the RPF and its accomplices, agents or
spies. In providing these support, the Interhamwe killed Tutsis because
they were deemed to support the RPF as accomplices, agents, spies or
collaborators, and Hutus who were opposed to the Interim Government.
Leading members of the Interim Government, particularly members of
the MRND and CDR political parties, the FAR and many members of
the business community in Rwanda were also members or leaders of the
Interahamwe.
Before and during the internal armed conflict, the Interahamwe
dedicated itself to the elimination of the Tutsi civilians, not because of
the armed conflict per se, but parallel to the process of implementing the
Hutu extremist ideology and its policy of genocide. The Interahamwe
had a two-pronged strategy: to kill all Tutsi civilians who were
accomplices, spies or agents of the RPF, and to kill the rest of the Tutsi
population in the process of implementing the Hutu extremist ideology.
Based on Article 6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute, whether members
or leaders of the Interahamwe are combatants in the armed conflict
between the FAR and the RPF, and are therefore individually responsible
for their culpable acts, it is submitted, is determined on a case-by-case
basis because the members or leaders of the Interahamwe played
different roles and carried out different functions in the course of the
armed conflict. The exercise of determining a nexus between the
culpable acts committed by the Interahamwe and the armed conflict
would necessitate considering the totality of the evidence adduced by the
Prosecutor against each accused member or leader of the Interahamwe in
order to determine whether the accused acted personally, as a
subordinate or as a superior. Consequently the evidence produced by the
Prosecutor in the Akayesu, Kayishema & Ruzindana, Rutaganda and
Musema, may or may not be sufficient depending on the criteria used by
the Trial Chamber in determining the existence, or lack thereof, of a
nexus between the culpable acts of members or leaders of the
Interahamwe and armed conflict on the one hand, and the quality of the
evidence adduced by the Prosecutor, on the other hand.
Conclusion
The nexus requirement between war crimes and internal armed
conflict is of great importance since Common Article 3 and Protocol II
are designed to protect all victims of internal armed conflicts. War
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crimes are inevitably connected with violations of Common Article 3 and
Protocol II. War crimes may also be committed parallel to, or
simultaneously with, crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity.
War crimes will occur if the criminal conduct of the accused took place
in the context of armed conflict, by a person or persons classified as a
perpetrator and the act or omission, or a series of acts or omissions
alleged to have been committed constitute violations of Article 4 of the
Statute. Criminal acts committed during or as a result of internal armed
conflict but for personal motives or reasons are not considered as having
any nexus with armed conflict.
In adopting Article 4 of the Statute, the Security Council took an
expansive approach. It would be prudent for the Trial Chambers to take a
similar approach and therefore adopt and apply the principle of judicial
activism in interpreting, or liberal interpretation of, Article 4 of the
Statute. This approach would be consistent with the objective of the
Security Council when it adopted the Statute.
In reaching its decisions the Trial Chamber should endeavour to
give examples of standard cases of nexus and use these benchmarks
against which to test other more controversial cases for the purpose of
determining nexus between war crimes and armed conflict. For example,
where the Prosecutor proves that an accused wore a military uniform,
before or during a military engagement against a party to an armed
conflict, carried guns or weapons openly, or a member or leader of an
armed group, the evidential burden should shift to the accused to prove
that he was not a party to an armed conflict. Upon the failure of the
accused to discharge that evidential burden, and where the Prosecutor
establishes a link between the alleged crimes committed by accused and
the internal armed conflict, the Trial Chamber should proceed to convict.
This approach would provide the necessary legal premise upon
which the Trial Chambers and the Prosecutor may legally disagree if
each has or acts on a different theory of why the standard cases should or
should not constitute nexus between war crimes and armed conflict. The
advantage of this approach is that each party will have knowledge of the
concept of nexus upon which they disagree and will, in principle, differ
only on which conception each organ of the Tribunal rely upon to show
that a particular act or omission, or a series of acts or omissions
constitute a nexus between war crimes and armed conflict.
In the absence of a formulation or a definition of the term nexus,
the Trial Chambers and the Prosecutor are more likely to have different
concepts or conceptions of what constitute nexus between war crimes
and armed conflicts. Therefore, whether there is a nexus between the
alleged war crimes and internal armed conflict in a given case is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt will ultimately depend on whether the Trial
Chambers formulate a concept of a nexus between war crimes and armed
conflict, and the Prosecutor is able to conceptualize that nexus and
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subsequently adduce sufficient evidence to prove the existence, or lack
thereof, of a nexus between war crimes and armed conflict, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
